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THE SCOPE OF THE POWER OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE TO REALLOCATE
UNDER SECTION 482
CONVERSE MURDOCH *
INTRODUCTION
When compared to the more recently constructed, ornate, and
sophisticated sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 1
 Section
482 is almost primitive in its simplicity of style. In fact, its very sim-
plicity makes it appear ridiculous, sitting as it does in the midst of
the much more elaborate sections of the Code. It has no subsections,
no definitions, no cross references, no exceptions and no mysterious
effective dates. In general, it provides that the Secretary of the
Treasury or his delegate may allocate among two or more commonly
controlled businesses or organizations "gross income, deductions,
credits or allowances" if he determines that such is necessary to "pre-
vent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of" the businesses
or organizations.'
HISTORY OF THE SECTION
The earliest ancestor of section 482 which bears an easily rec-
ognizable resemblance to it was Section 45 of the Revenue Act of
1928.3
 The provision in that statute provided for allocation of gross
income or deductions. No mention of credits or allowances was made.
The Ways and Means Committee report on the bill destined to
become the Revenue Act of 19284
 explained that the section con-
stituted a broadened version of Section 240(f) of the Revenue Act
of 1926' and was necessitated by the elimination of the consolidated
return provisions of the 1926 Act.
* A.B. Bowdoin College, 1941; LL.B. Columbia University Law School, 1947;
LL.M. Georgetown University Law School, 1951. Member, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Delaware Bars, Tax Counsel, Berl, Potter & Anderson, Wilmington, Delaware.
I Hereafter in this article the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 will be referred to
simply as the "Code." The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 will be referred to as the 1939
Code.
2 The full text is as follows:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether
or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
the Secretary or his delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades,
or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or alloca-
tion is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the
income of any of such organizations, trades or businesses. Int. Rev. Code of 1954
§ 482.
3 Revenue Act of 1928, § 45, 45 Stat. 806.
4 H.R. Rep. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928).
5 Revenue Act of 1926, § 240(f), 44 Stat. 46.
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Section 240(1) of the Revenue Act of 1926 had provided that the
Commissioner might (or at the request of the taxpayer, should) "con-
solidate the accounts" of commonly controlled trades or businesses,
if such was "necessary in order to make an accurate distribution or
apportionment of gains, profits, income, deductions or capital" among
the commonly controlled businesses.
There were certain striking differences between Section 240(f)
of the 1926 Revenue Act and Section 45 of the 1928 Revenue Act.
In the 1928 statute, the taxpayer was no longer privileged to require
a reallocation. Thus the provision became solely a government sword
and was no longer available as a taxpayer shield. A second (and, for
present purposes, a most important) difference between the two pro-
visions was that whereas the former permitted a consolidation of
accounts of the related businesses, the latter section merely authorized
the Commissioner to reallocate gross income and deductions among the
related businesses. This difference was noted in the House Committee
Report and explained as a change aimed at forestalling any contention
that non-affiliated corporations can achieve the equivalent of a filing
of a consolidated return.'
The House Committee Report on Section 45 of the 1928 Act'
mentioned the following abuses at which the section was aimed: "the
shifting of profits, the making of fictitious sales, and other methods
frequently adopted for the purpose of 'milking.'"
In the Revenue Act of 1934,8 the corresponding section was
slightly expanded to add the term "organization" to the terms "trades
or businesses" used in prior law to describe the entities among which
reallocations could be made. The congressional committee reports
accompanying this change explained that while it was felt that prior
law was broad enough to include "organizations," the change was be-
ing made to remove any doubt that the section applies to all kinds of
"business activity." Absent that explanation in the committee reports,
one might have assumed that the insertion of the term "organizations"
was done in order to bring within the statutory provisions non-business
entities such as charitable corporations.'
The next change in the statutory language occurred in 1943, when
Section 45 of the 1939 Code was amendedl° to expand the list of items
6 H.R. Rep. No. 2, supra note 4.
7 Ibid.
8 Revenue Act of 1934, § 45, 48 Stat. 695.
9 H.R. Rep. No, 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. Rep. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934). The current provision in the regulations—Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1)
(1962)—indicating that the section can be applied to exempt organizations has been
approved. See Southern College of Optometry, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 354 (1947), up-
holding an earlier version of this regulation.
10 Revenue Act of 1943, § 128(b), 58 Stat. 47.
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subject to reallocation. Previously, only gross income and deductions
had been mentioned. The 1943 amendment added credits and allow-
ances to the list of items subject to reallocation. The congressional
committee reports accompanying this change" - stated that the purpose
of the insertion of the new words was to make the section coextensive
with Section 129 of the 1939 Code' added by the same Revenue Act
of 1943. In the opinion of the draftsmen of the committee reports,
the changes in section 45 made no changes in then existing law.
Section 45 of the 1939 Code as last amended in 1943 has emerged
virtually intact as Section 482 of the 1954 Code.
CONTROL BY SAME INTERESTS
The first step in considering the potential applicability of Code
section 482 is to determine whether the two or more organizations
among which allocation might be attempted are "owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests." The quoted statutory
language is extremely vague. The plastic nature of this part of the
statute has resulted in the Treasury (in its regulations) and the courts
(in their decisions) including within section 482 myriad combinations
of businesses. The common control aspect of section 482 is not tied,
by cross reference or otherwise, to the stock attribution rules of section
318, to the definition of controlled groups found in section 1563, or to
the related taxpayers' provisions of section 267. In this regard, section
482 stands on its own.
The treasury regulations state:
[Control] includes any kind of control, direct or in-
direct, whether legally enforceable, and however exercisable
or exercised. It is the reality of the control which is decisive,
not its form or the mode of its exercise. A presumption of
control arises if income or deductions have been arbitrarily
shifted.'
The last quoted sentence in the regulations smacks of "boot
strap" reasoning. The Internal Revenue Service is authorized to use
section 482 to prevent the arbitrary shifting of income and deductions.
The determination by the Internal Revenue Service that there has
been such an arbitrary shitting is presumptively correct." Hence, if
the quoted sentence is accepted literally, the taxpayer who disputes
the assertion that it is part of a commonly controlled group is faced
11 H.R. Rep. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); S. Rep, No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1943).
12 This is comparable to § 269 of the 1954 Code.
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a) (3) (1962).
14 9 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 50.6! (1942).
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with a "presumption on a presumption." In litigating the issue of
control, the taxpayer must win on the ultimate issue (i.e., has there
been arbitrary shifting of income and deductions) before he can raise
the threshold issue (i.e., is he part of a commonly controlled group)."
In most situations in which the Service proposes reallocations un-
der section 482, the existence of the essential element of common con-
trol is obvious. Parent and wholly-owned subsidiary corporations,
brother and sister corporations with identical stockholders owning ex-
actly proportionate shares, and partnerships with identical partnership
interests are clear examples of commonly controlled entities. Relying
on the plasticity of the Code and on the breadth of the regulations, the
courts have found common control in instances far removed from the
clear situations just mentioned. Thus, the courts have not hesitated to
amalgamate interests held by all members of a family or held by trusts
for members of a family in determining the existence of common con-
trol." In the recent decision in South Tex. Rice Warehouse Co., "
the Tax Court found common control as between a family partnership
and a family corporation even though 35 percent of the stock of the
corporation was owned by individuals who did not hold interests in the
partnership. In reaching that result, the Tax Court relied in part on
the proposition that the business operations of the partnership (dry-
ing and warehousing rice) were tied to the operations of the corpora-
tion (owning and leasing facilities for drying and storing of rice).
There is no authority in the statute for concluding that businesses are
commonly controlled merely because their operations are interde-
pendent. Accordingly, the Tax Court's statement of interdependence
of business operations to show common control is nothing more than
a make-weight argument to support a conclusion already reached on
other grounds. If mere integration of business operations were in itself
sufficient to show common control, 482 would suddenly become sig-
nificant in a host of situations where it has never been considered
applicable. In other words, if interdependence of business operations
were alone enough to show common control, an automobile manufac-
turer and a franchised dealer would be considered under common con-
trol on the ground that without the products of the manufacturer,
the dealer would have no inventory and that concomitantly the manu-
facturer would have no outlet for his product in the dealer's area.
It is not possible to find an exact line of demarcation with respect
to the degrees of common ownership beyond which the Service may
not go in applying section 482. In General Counsel's Memorandum
15 For a demonstration of the problem just posed, see Hall v. Commissioner, 294
F.2d 82, 87 (5th Cir. 1961), particularly the dissenting opinion by Judge Brown.
16 Grenada Indus., Inc., 17 T.C. 231 (1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1953).
17 43 T.C. No. 44 (Jan. 29, 1965).
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2856,18
 it was stated (in considering the early ancestors of section 482)
that the Board of Tax Appeals had aptly described the terms "owned
or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests" as " 'doubt-
ful' and impossible of a strict definition."
In Cedar Valley Distillery, Inc., 19
 the Tax Court expressed doubt
that there was sufficient common control for purposes of Section 45
of the 1939 Code (Section 482 of 1954 Code) as between a partner-
ship and a corporation. There, fifty-two stockholders owned 46 percent
of the corporate stock and owned no interests in the partnership; the
individual who owned 54 percent of the corporation's stock had a 30
percent interest in the partnership; and another 30 percent partner had
no interest of any kind in the corporation. The court held that even
if there were common control of the partnership and the corporation,
the circumstances did not warrant allocation of the partnership income
to the corporation. Hence, the comments of the court regarding the
community of control are dicta. Nonetheless, the case furnishes a
bench mark—albeit a somewhat blurred one.
In Matter of John S. Barnes, Inc.," a decision involving a tax
claim against a bankrupt corporation, the court held that there was
not the common control requisite for Section 45 of the 1939 Code
where the suspect relationship was between a partnership and the
debtor corporation. There, only the holders of 41.9 percent of the
debtor's stock were interested in the partnership, and the debtor's
stockholders held only a 35 percent interest in the partnership. Again,
as in the Cedar Valley Distillery case, the court also found that the
dealings between the two corporations were not sufficient to justify
allocation under Section 45 of the 1939 Code. Nonetheless, in Barnes,
the court flatly stated as its conclusion that the comparative degrees
of common ownership meant that the community of control element
of the statute was lacking.
In A. G. Nelson Paper Co.," the Tax Court refused to attribute
stock in lessor and lessee corporations held by husbands to their wives
and vice versa for the purposes of Section 45 of the 1939 Code.
There the facts were particularly strong for the taxpayer: it appeared
that the wives had purchased their interests in the lessor corporation
with funds secured independently. The decision in Epsen Lithogra-
phers, Inc. v. O'Malley' is to the same effect. In O'Malley, the wife's
interest in the partnership was purchased with independent funds.
In summary, it may be observed that no cases have been found
18
 Vii - 1 Cum. Bull. 128, 130 (1928).
19
 16 T.C. 870 (1951).
2° 53-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9470 (S.D. Fla. 1953).
21 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 914 (1944).
22 67 F. Supp. 181 (D. Neb. 1946).
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in which the courts determined that the requisite community of control
did not exist without at the same time finding that there was no re-
allocation justified. This is not to suggest that there could not be cases
where there was lacking the community of control sufficient to bring
section 482 into play while there was present an arbitrary shifting
of income, It is rather to indicate that, to date, the Service has not
brought such a case before a court.
DETERMINATION OF NECESSITY FOR APPLICATION OF SECTION 482
Assuming that there is present the community of control requisite
for the use of section 482, the next inquiry is whether the second of
the statutory conditions for use of the section is also present. That
second condition is a determination by the Service that a distribution,
apportionment or allocation of gross income, deductions, credits or
allowances "is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to re-
flect the income of any of such organizations, trades or businesses."
It is significant to note that the statute speaks in terms of permitting
the Service to concentrate on a determination which will clearly re-
flect the income of any one of the related organizations—rather than
reflecting clearly the incomes of all of the organizations. This point is
not discussed in the legislative history, in the regulations, or in the
court decisions. However, there is no question that the statute is
drafted in such a way as to permit the Service to contend that it can
reallocate items toward the end of truly reflecting the income of one
member of a controlled group regardless of the effect on the income of
another member.
This can be a matter of more than academic interest. Where one
of the corporations is subject to the income tax laws of a foreign coun-
try but not those of the United States, the problem posed by concen-
trating on a picture of the related corporation subject to United States
jurisdiction without regard to the effect on the foreign corporation
can cause serious international double taxation problems. This prob-
lem was recognized by the Service when it issued Technical Informa-
tion Release 491' and suggested that United States taxpayers with
foreign affiliates urge the latter to take steps to secure downward
adjustments of foreign income taxes where the United States tax
authorities were proposing increased United States taxes through what
amounts to allocation of foreign income to the United States taxpayers.
While the issuance of TIR 491 was presumably done with the best
of motives on the part of the United States taxing authorities, in the
23 6 CCH 1963 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. j 6517.
In Rev. Proc. 64-54, the Service announced some relief from the double taxation
effects of section 482 allocations as between United States and foreign entities with
respect to taxable years beginning prior to January 1, 1963. 1964-52 Int, Rev. Bull. No. 26.
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process they glossed over a most serious problem, i.e., what to do if
the foreign tax authorities insist that the reallocation of income by the
United States authorities fails to reflect correctly the income of the
foreign taxpayer. This is only one of the problems which are bound to
arise when reallocations are done with regard to the income picture of
only one of the related entities.
The treasury regulations provide:
The purpose of section 482 is to place a controlled tax-
payer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, by de-
termining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled tax-
payer, the true taxable income from the property and
business of a controlled taxpayer. The interests controlling
a group of controlled taxpayers are assumed to have complete
power to cause each controlled taxpayer so to conduct its
affairs that its transactions and accounting records truly re-
flect the taxable income from the property and business of
each of the controlled taxpayers. If, however, this has not
been done, and the taxable incomes are thereby understated,
the district director shall intervene, and, by making such
distributions, apportionments, or allocations as he may deem
necessary of gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances,
or of any item or element affecting taxable income, between
or among the controlled taxpayers constituting the group,
shall determine the true taxable income of each controlled
taxpayer. The standard to be applied in every case is that
of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with
another uncontrolled taxpayer."
Thus, the regulations direct that when the district director finds
the interdicted situation, he shall take appropriate actions to "deter-
mine the true taxable income of each controlled taxpayer." That
statement in the regulations would seem to furnish good authority
for the proposition that in operating under section 482 the Service
has some duty of consistency of treatment of all members of the con-
trolled group. Accordingly, in applying section 482, the Service should
act in the role of an impartial arbitrator—seeking to find allocations
which are fair to all controlled taxpayers. The Service should not
assume the role of an advocate urging the maximum benefit for
the particular entity whose increased income will produce the maxi-
mum tax revenue.
In keeping with the style of the 1954 Code and in conformity
with the provisions of the Treasury Department Reorganization
24
 Treas. Reg. § 1 482-1(b) (1) (1962).
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Plans,' section 482 gives authority to make determinations regarding
the necessity of applying the section to the "Secretary [of the Treas-
ury] or his delegate." The regulations under 482 mention only one
official as having the power to act under the section—the district direc-
tor of internal revenue,' In Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. United
States," the taxpayer contended that the action of an examining
revenue agent in proposing a reallocation of expenses as between a
parent and wholly-owned subsidiary constituted an "invoking" of the
section. The government denied that conclusion and argued that only
a district director (and not an examining agent) had the power to
invoke the section. The court in the Interstate case rejected the govern-
ment's argument on this point by reaching the practical conclusion
that the district director had redelegated to his examining agent the
power to invoke section 482. That conclusion accords with the prac-
ticalities of the situation and avoids the unfairness which results from
permitting the government to deny the authority of its agents after
clothing them with the appearance of broad authority.
If, despite the Interstate decision, the government persists in con-
tending that no revenue official other than a district director may in-
voke section 482, we can look forward to some intriguing procedural
snarls. For example, assume a case in which a deficiency is proposed
by the district director but not on the basis of a section 482 allocation
and the audit result is protested to the Appellate Division. If the
government's argument that only a district director may invoke section
482 is to be accepted literally, the result will be that the Appellate
Division may not invoke section 482 as an additional ground to sup-
port the district director's proposed deficiency. The same argument
would also cast doubt on the authority of the Appellate Division (or,
for that matter, any other Treasury official) to reverse or modify the
action of a district director once the latter has invoked section 482.
It is not in the least unusual for separate members of a com-
monly controlled group to file their tax returns in offices of different
district directors. The acceptance of the government's argument in the
Interstate case would pose some potentially insoluble procedural
problems in such circumstances. Assume that corporations A and B
file in different districts but are subject to sufficient common control
to make section 482 potentially applicable to their affairs. Assume
further that the district director for A's district determines that all of
B's gross income should be reallocated to A. The district director,
with whom B files its returns, accepts the return as filed, i.e., without
25 Reorganization Plan No. 26 of 1950 and Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1952. Sec-
tion 7804 of the 1954 Code.
26 Treas. Regs. §§ 1.482-1(b) (1) and (3) (1962).
27 215 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
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allocation of B's income to A. The problem which then arises is which
district director's section 482 determination controls. An even more
nightmarish situation can arise if the second district director makes a
determination that under section 482 all of the income of corporation
A is properly allocable to B, i.e., the corporation filing in his district.
It is difficult to imagine any court permitting two coordinate govern-
ment officials to enforce such a grossly unfair result. However, any
practitioner who has been caught in a situation where the Service
is maintaining two or more concededly inconsistent positions in order
"to protect the revenue" can testify that the posited situation is far
from fanciful. The point is that so long as the government argues
for strict construction of the regulations' provisions regarding the
authority to act under section 482, these situations may very well
arise. The Service owes the taxpayers an official statement which will
forestall such patently unjust determinations and which will in the
process repudiate the extreme argument on this point advanced in
the Interstate case.
It is now beyond question that a reallocation under section 482 is
a power given to the government but is not a procedure which can be
initiated by a taxpayer. 28
THE SCOPE OF THE SERVICE'S AUTHORITY UNDER 482
Assuming the presence of the two basic operative circumstances
(i.e., the requisite community of control and a determination that re-
allocation is necessary to properly reflect income or prevent tax
evasion), the next inquiry concerns a delimitation of precisely what
the Service can and cannot do under section 482.
Consolidation of Taxable Incomes
The regulations state categorically that section 482 is not in-
tended to "produce a result equivalent to a computation of consoli-
dated taxable income under sub-chapter A, chapter 6 of the Code [re-
lating to consolidating income tax returns]." 29
 With such a flat state-
ment in the regulations, it is surprising to find the Service using section
482 to reallocate to one taxpayer the entire net income of another
taxpayer. It is even more surprising to find some courts approving
this use of the section.
In a series of decisions the Tax Court has unequivocally expressed
the view that section 482 and its predecessor sections permitted the
Service to allocate specific items of gross income and deductions but
not to allocate entire bundles of net income from one taxpayer to
28 Treas. Reg.	 1.482-1(b)(3) (1962). See First Sec. Corp. v. Clements, 103 F.2d
1011 (6th Cir. 1939).
29 Treas. Reg.	 1.482-1(b) (3) (1962).
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another." In a recent group of cases involving an attempt by the
Service to ignore the separateness of so-called "multiple corporations"
used in the building construction business, the Tax Court studiously
avoided approving the Service's use of section 482 or its prior equiva-
lent to combine all of the incomes of the separate corporations.'
One of these cases, Kessmar Constr. Co.," involved not a combining
of net incomes but rather a spreading of a single surtax exemption
among the multiple corporations. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit specifically refused to approve or disapprove
the Tax Court's reliance on section 482 as a basis for cutting down
surtax exemptions.
Until 1964 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood
alone in its view that section 482 could be utilized by the Service to
combine the net incomes of related corporations. It adopted this posi-
tion in Advance Mach. Exch., Inc. v. Commissioner." In that case,
the record was particularly damaging in its implications for the tax-
payer. A sole proprietorship and three closely controlled corporations
were engaged in the same business, at the same location, and utilized
the same personnel. The record keeping of the members of the group
was very irregular, including alteration of invoices and destruction
of records before the trial. In the Tax Court the government contended
that the incomes of all the entities should be taxed to the petitioner
on the basis of Sections 22(a) and 45 of the 1939 Code. Reliance on
the former boiled down to a contention that in reality the dealings of
the other entities were sham and to be ignored. In its opinion, the Tax
Court, after noting the government's reliance on both sections 22(a)
and 45, concluded: "that petitioner has not shown that respondent
erred in attributing to it the net income of the three other businesses,
and that such income is taxable to petitioner under the broad scope
of section 22(a)."34 Despite the Tax Court's significant refusal to do
more than approve the Commissioner's action under 22(a) (but not
under 45) the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated the issue
to be: "Whether the Tax Court was correct in allocating income to
the petitioner under § 45, I.R.C. . ." The reviewing court went on to
affirm the Tax Court's decision. In the course of its opinion, the court
of appeals noted the provision in the Treasury regulations that Section
30 T.V.D. Co., 27 T.C. 879, 884-85 (1957); J. I, Byrne, 16 T.C. 1234, 1243 (1951) ;
Cedar Valley Distillery, Inc., supra note 19; Chelsea Prods., Inc., 16 T.C. 840 (1951),
aff'd, 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952); Seminole Flavor Co., 4 T.C. 1215 (1945).
81 Shaw Constr. Co., 35 T.C. 1102 (1961), aff'd, 323 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963); Alden
Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582 (1959).
22 39 T.C. 778 (1963), aff'd, 336 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1964).
83 196 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 835 (1952).
34 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 84, 88-89 (1949).
726
REALLOCATION POWERS UNDER SECTION 482
45 of the 1939 Code could not be used to achieve the effect of a con-
solidation and stated:
At first blush, this regulation would seem to support
the petitioner's position but analysis shows the contrary. The
effect of such an interpretation would be to exclude from the
applicability of § 45 fact situations like the present one if
the separate entities involved were all corporations and the
Commissioner had sought to allocate all of the income from
each to one of them, since this "would produce a result
equivalent to a computation of consolidated net income under
§ 141." It may, perhaps, be sufficient for the present to
point out that what was done is not, strictly, equivalent to
a consolidation under § 141 since, under that section, only
the income of affiliated corporations may be consolidated
while here the income of a sole proprietorship was included.
However, we do not rely entirely upon this distinction. What-
ever valid interpretation may be given this regulation, the
unsoundness of that of the petitioner is illustrated by the fact
that it would exclude from the "policing" provisions of § 45
the most flagrant evasion by arbitrary shifting of income.
It would let the Commissioner reallocate the income of these
separate entities, to reflect the income of each correctly, if
the amount involved, however great, did not equal their
total combined income but he could not apply § 45 at all
if the taxpayers succeeded in constructing a situation where,
in order to prevent tax evasion or properly to reflect income,
it were necessary to attribute all of the income of the separate
entities to one of them, as was done here. Thus tax evasion
could be so complete as to make itself invulnerable, a proposi-
tion whose statement discloses its fallacy 35
The court of appeals gave a two-pronged answer to the taxpayer's
argument. First, the court said that since the taxpayer group was not
such as would qualify to file consolidated returns, the result was not
the equivalent of a consolidation. This seems a hyper-technical argu-
ment. If accepted as an interpretation of the regulations, this answer
would mean that section 482 could be used to accomplish a consolidation
in every situation except the ones in which the law regarding con-
solidated returns permitted consolidation. Such would be an anomalous
result. The court of appeals was not content to rely on that explana-
tion of the regulation. It went on to state that acceptance of the tax-
payer's argument would forestall correction of a situation where the
85 Advance Mach. Exch., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 33, at 1009.
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entire net income was improperly reported by the "wrong" taxpayer
while permitting a reallocation of something less than the entire net
income. This second answer involves logic which is unassailable if the
issue was either whether the regulations should contain the provision
in question or whether the statute should be amended to permit re-
allocations of net income. However, the court's statement is open to
serious question when the inquiry involves the method of applying
the regulation. Nonetheless, in the Advance Mach. decision, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit unequivocally announced its view
that Section 45 of the 1939 Code could be utilized by the Commis-
sioner to achieve what amounts to a forced consolidation. It is un-
fortunate that this pronouncement came in a case involving a record
of taxpayer capers which undoubtedly outraged the courts.
Within two months of the announcement of the Second Circuit's
decision in the Advance Mach. case, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in Commissioner v. Chelsea Prods., Inc.," held that
Section 45 of the 1939 Code did not permit reallocation of the entire
net income of a taxpayer. The latter court noted the contrary position
taken in the Advance Mach. case and referred to the statements in
that case regarding section 45 as dicta, in view of the fact that the
Tax Court's decision in Advance Mach.. was based on section 22(a)
rather than section 45.
Immediately after the Third Circuit's decision in Chelsea Prods.,
the situation was as follows: the Tax Court had consistently held that
section 45 could not be used to combine net incomes of related tax-
payers; the Third Circuit had approved this position; and the Second
Circuit had held to the contrary on the mistaken assumption that in
so doing it was approving the Tax Court's position.
In Ballentine Motor Co." the Tax Court considered the situation
in which a corporation previously engaged in the used car retailing
business in Georgia had a sizable net operating loss. The corporation
purchased used car inventories of related corporations located on
South Carolina premises and proceeded to sell the inventory at the
South Carolina locations until its net operating losses had been absorbed
by profits. Thereafter the Georgia corporation ceased conducting South
Carolina sales. The Tax Court characterized this maneuver as "tax
avoidance" and "tax evasion" and held that the Commissioner was
correct in utilizing section 482 to allocate the profit from the trans-
ferred South Carolina inventory away from the Georgia corporation.
It is important to note that the Commissioner did not attempt to
allocate all of the Georgia corporation's net income to the petitioner;
rather, he merely allocated the net profit from particular transactions.
86 Supra note 30.
37 39 T.C. 348 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1963).
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The latter is hardly the equivalent of consolidating the various related
corporations. In the course of its opinion in the Ballentine Motor Co.
case, the Tax Court stated:
We believe that net income may in certain instances be
properly allocated under section 45 and currently section
482. If net profits are shifted (one device at which the statute
was specifically directed), it would be a logical short cut to
allocate them instead of allocating "gross income, deductions,
credits, [etc.]." The other devices of income shifting men-
tioned by the committee reports similarly suggest allocation
of such income. The statute allows allocation of gross income
and deductions, and to the extent this is permitted we believe
it may be done as "net income."
We do not construe Chelsea Products, Inc., or T.V.D.
Co. to prevent this type of allocation. In Chelsea Products,
Inc., and in T.V.D. Co., . . . respondent's principal
arguments were that the income was earned by sham corpora-
tions, and in each case this argument was rejected on the
facts. Here he is contending that income was shifted to a
valid and subsisting corporation but that the transfer was
to evade taxes and resulted in a distortion of income. 38
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's decision in Ballentine Motor Co. without any discussion of
the question of whether section 482 permits consolidations or realloca-
tions of net income.
In Hamburgers York Rd., Inc.," the Tax Court for the first
time flatly rejected its own early decisions to the contrary and per-
mitted the Commissioner to allocate the entire net income of one
corporation to a related corporation. In so doing, the Tax Court ac-
cepted the reasoning of the Second Circuit in the Advance Mach. case.
In Nat Harrison Associates, Inc.,4° the Tax Court again noted
that its present position is that section 482 permits allocations of net
income.
At the moment, the Tax Court and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals are of the definite opinion that 482 can be used to allocate
not only a part of a taxpayer's net income, but its entire net income to
a related taxpayer. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
implicitly sanctioned the allocation of a part of net income" and the
39 Id. at 3.58-59.
39 41 T.C. 821 (1964).
40 42 T.C. 601 (1964).
41 Through its affirmance of the Ballentine Motor Co. decision, supra note 37.
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has flatly stated that section
482 cannot be used to allocate the entire net income of a corporation
to another taxpayer. Absent legislative change, the issue is likely to
be litigated for some time.
482 Not Usable to Create Income
The courts have consistently refused to permit the Commissioner
to use section 482 to create "imputed" income where none exists.
In Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner,' the tax-
payer had permitted a related corporation to use its equipment without
charge. The Commissioner attempted to impute rental income to the
corporation which owned the equipment. The Sixth Circuit held that
section 45 did not give the Commissioner the authority to "set up in-
come where none existed." There is language in the opinion which im-
plies that the Commissioner, had he proceeded correctly, might have
achieved the same result by allocating to the taxpayer an amount of the
related corporation's income equivalent to what the Commissioner
determined should have been rent.
No Complete Disallowance of Actual Realized Losses and Expenses
In General Indus. Corp.," one corporation sold securities at fair
market value to a related corporation. The action of the Commissioner
in disallowing the transferor's deduction of the resulting loss was held
not supportable by section 45. Section 267 of the 1954 Code may,
under appropriate circumstances, serve to disallow losses on trans-
actions between related taxpayers, but that section, unlike section 482,
is particular and limited in its application.
The General Indus. case involved a sale at fair market value.
Where a sale between related entities has not been at fair market
value, the use of Section 45 of the 1939 Code to deny losses resulting
from such transactions has been approved."
In Chicago & Nw. Ry.," a parent railroad corporation issued
its own bonds to raise funds which were in turn lent to a subsidiary.
The subsidiary became hopelessly in default on its interest payments
to the parent. The Tax Court held that section 45 did not authorize
the Commissioner to disallow a part of the parent's interest deductions
merely because corresponding interest accruals on the loans to the
subsidiary were not required to be reported in the parent's income.
42 112 F.2d 508 (6th Or. 1940). To the same effect see E. C. Laster, 43 B.T.A. 159
(1940), aff'd and rev'd on other grounds, 128 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Smith-Bridgman
& Co., 16 T.C. 287 (1951).
43 35 B.T.A. 615 (1937).
94 G.U.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941).
4s 29 T.C. 989 (1958).
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Dividend Effects
Section 482 is in the nature of a "make-believe" section, in the
sense that it permits computation of tax liabilities on the basis of
treating transactions as if they were accomplished in a way different
from the way they actually occurred. In all games of "make-believe,"
a point is reached at which the fiction must cease and all concerned
must return to reality. The section 482 make-believe game goes
smoothly as long as the only moves are those relating to shifting in-
come and deductions and computing resulting tax liabilities. In Waiter
L. Morgan," the Tax Court considered a case in which the income of
corporation A had been treated as taxable to corporation B pursuant
to the provisions of Section 45 of the 1939 Code. When corporation
A was liquidated—with corporation B remaining in existence—the
Commissioner contended that the liquidating distributions from cor-
poration A were dividends from B. This argument was advanced on
the ground that by the operation of section 45 the income of A had
become part of the accumulated earnings and profits of B. The Tax
Court refused to approve this use of section 45, pointing out that
while section 45 authorized the distribution, apportionment, or alloca-
tion of gross income, deductions, credits or allowances, it did not ex-
pressly or impliedly authorize the distribution, apportionment or al-
location of net assets, surplus or accumulated earnings and profits.
The result in the Morgan case should be contrasted with that in
Helvering v. Gordon" where income of corporation A, diverted to
corporation B and distributed by B, was treated as a dividend from A.
There, the court of appeals did not rely on section 45. Rather, the
court held that B was in effect acting as an agent of A and serving as
a mere conduit for the transmission of A's earnings to A's stock-
holders.
In Forcum-James Co.," a corporation received income under a
construction contract and paid over a large part of it to a related
partnership. The Tax Court upheld the action of the Commissioner
in allocating the partnership income to the corporation. The Tax
Court also held that such reallocated income was to be treated as a
dividend from the corporation to the members of the partnership. The
long range significance of the Forcum-James decision is doubtful due
to the fact that the case was settled while on appeal. In any event, the
situation in Forcum-James was distinguishable from that in Morgan.
46 33 T.C. 30 (1959), rev'd on another issue, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 836 (1961).
47 87 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1937).
48 7 T.C. 1195 (1946), remanded for entry of order of settlement pursuant to stip-
ulation, 176 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1949).
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In the former, the payment labelled a dividend actually moved from
the corporation to which the income was allocated, while in the latter,
the distribution in question moved from an entity other than that to
which the income was allocated under section 45.
Hugh Smith, Inc.49
 is a decision more difficult to reconcile with
the Morgan case. In Hugh Smith, the taxpayer corporation had a fran-
chise to distribute Coca Cola, subject to an obligation to pay $1.30
per syrup gallon to its licensor. The taxpayer granted a sub-license to
its controlling stockholder with a $1.50 gallonage charge. The con-
trolling stockholder bypassed the taxpayer in purchasing syrup, paying
the distributor $1.30 per gallon. This was the same price provided
under the taxpayer's agreement with its licensor, but 20¢ per gallon less
than the price called for under the agreement between the taxpayer and
its controlling stockholder. The Tax Court approved the Commis-
sioner's use of section 45 to allocate to the taxpayer corporation an
amount of its stockholder's gross income equal to 200 per gallon of
syrup used by the stockholder. This allocation made the corporation
liable for personal holding company tax. However, the Tax Court went
on to hold that the income allocated from the stockholder to the corpora-
tion was in effect a dividend distribution to the stockholder. While it is
difficult to reconcile the Tax Court's decisions in the Hugh Smith and
Morgan cases, the Commissioner's non-acquiescence in the Hugh
Smith" case is entirely consistent with his acquiescence in the some-
what contrary decision in the Morgan case.
In Seminole Flavor Co.," the Tax Court disapproved the Com-
missioner's action in allocating income of a partnership to a related
corporation. The Commissioner alleged that the shifting of profits
from the corporation to the partnership resulted in tax evasion. He
attempted to prove this by computations which assumed that the
profits reallocated to the corporation were again taxed to the partners
as dividend distributions from the corporation. The Tax Court re-
jected this reasoning and stated that section 45 did not authorize the
creation of constructive dividends. It is difficult to reconcile this result
with Hugh Smith, but again the Commissioner's acquiescence in the
Seminole Flavor Co. case is consistent with his non-acquiescence in
the Hugh Smith and his acquiescence in Morgan.
The present situation is that the authorities support the proposi-
tion that section 482 cannot be used to create dividend income absent a
conclusion that there has been an actual diversion of income, as opposed
" 8 T.C. 660 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 173 F.2d 224 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 918 (1949).
50 The constructive dividend result in the Hugh Smith case was contrary to the con-
tention of the Commissioner.
m Supra note 30.
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to a mere reallocation under section 482. The Commissioner has in-
dicated his acceptance of this proposition.
The question of when the game of section 482 make-believe ends
is pertinent in connection with resulting collection problems. Assume
that the Service, acting pursuant to section 482, allocates all of the
income of corporation A to corporation B. Assume further that this
reallocation is sustained and that a court approves the assessment of
a deficiency against B but does not decree that A is a sham entity
whose existence is to be ignored for tax purposes. Lastly, assume that
there has been no actual diversion of property from A to B and that A
in fact has retained all of the reallocated income while B (the corpo-
ration against which the resulting deficiency is assessed) has no assets
as of the time of the assessment. This situation places serious obstacles
between the Commissioner and the enjoyment of the fruits of his
section 482 victory, viz., how does the Service go about collecting the
deficiency which it has succeeded in assessing against a taxpayer with
no assets. If, as the Tax Court held in the Morgan case," section 45
may not be used to reallocate assets, it is difficult to see how the Com-
missioner can proceed to enforce collection of B's tax liabilities out
of the assets of A. The only provision of the Code which furnishes any
basis for the Commissioner to proceed against B is section 6901, which
relates to the collection of income tax liability from a "transferee of
property" to the extent of the transferee's "liability at law or in
equity." Absent a strong showing of a manipulation of funds or assets
in a section 482 case, the transferee liability provisions of the law do
not seem adequate to enforce liability in such a situation.
Use of 482 To Reallocate Among Succeeding Interests
The usual situation in which section 482 is employed is one in
which the Service proposes to shift income or deductions from one
taxpayer to another with no shift in the timing of the deduction. Thus,
a typical situation occurs when A, during 1964, pays certain expenses
but when the Service reallocates the deduction of such expenses to B. B
is treated as having paid these expenses at the same time as they were
actually paid by A, i.e., during 1964.
In addition, the typical 482 situation has not involved the problem
raised when a related taxpayer succeeds to the interest of another.
However, section 482 may be used by the Service when a related
taxpayer's income or expenses associated with an asset or a transaction
is shifted to a related taxpayer from which the first taxpayer acquired
an interest in the asset or transaction—or vice versa.
52 Supra note 46.
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In Tennessee Life Ins. Co. v. Phinney" corporation S owned real
estate from January 1, 1953, until January 19, 1953. On the latter date,
S was liquidated into its parent—P. The Fifth Circuit approved the
action of the Commissioner in allowing S to deduct only 18/365ths of
the real estate taxes on its property for the year 1953. The court
relied in part on the proposition that this result was in accord with
S's former method of accounting for real estate taxes. However, the
court went on to base its decision on the ground that the result was
justified under section 45. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that its
decision was contrary to the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Simon J.
Murphy Co. v. Commissioner." In Revenue Ruling 62-45 55 the Service
announced that it would not follow the Simon J. Murphy Co. decision
but would adhere to the view it successfully advanced in Tennessee
Life Ins. Co.
In Rooney v. United States," the individual taxpayers had oper-
ated a hop farm until July 31, 1954, when they transferred the farm
to a controlled corporation in a transaction which was tax free under
section 351 of the Code. Before the transfer, the individuals incurred
considerable expense in raising the crop, which crop was not sold until
after the corporation became the owner. The contract for the sale of
the crop had been entered into prior to the transfer to the corporation.
However, the last-mentioned fact did not appear to be a decisive ele-
ment in the case. The Ninth Circuit approved the Service's action in
allocating the expenses of raising the crop from the individuals to
the corporation which had realized the income from the crop.
The court in the Rooney case rejected the taxpayer's argument
that the result conflicted with the provisions of section 351, providing
for a tax-free transfer to a controlled corporation and a resulting use
by the transferee of the transferor's basis. The Ninth Circuit held that,
in effect, section 482 overrode section 351. In so deciding, the Ninth
Circuit was following the decision of the Third Circuit in National
Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner."
There is no question that in situations such as that posed by
Rooney the Service can use section 482 to move deductions over to
meet the related income or can shift income to meet related expenses.
The latter was the technique approved in Jud Plumbing & Heating
Inc. v. Commissioner."
55
 280 F.2d 38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 914 (1960).
54 231 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1956).
55 1962-1 Cum, Bull. 27.
56
 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962).
57 137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943).
68 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946).
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The Significance of the Presence or Absence of "Good Business
Purpose" in a Challenged Situation
At the present time, it is a brave tax advisor who will urge a
course of action or litigate a tax case unless he can demonstrate the
presence of a "good business purpose." It is difficult to imagine a
tax controversy in which the taxpayer's side of the argument is not
materially strengthened by a demonstrable business motive for the
taxpayer's actions. It is likewise true that the absence of a good busi-
ness purpose considerably improves the Service's prospects of victory.
Section 482 cases are not exceptions to such a generalization. This last
statement is made despite the comments of the Second Circuit in
Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioner." There, the Tax Court had
disapproved the Commissioner's action in allocating expenses of pro-
ducing a crop to a successor corporation which realized the income
from the crop—i.e., roughly the same situation as in Rooney. The Tax
Court based its decision on the ground that the transfer to the con-
trolled corporation was "not primarily related to tax saving." In re-
versing on this point, the Second Circuit pointed out that the Tax
Court's assumption of the necessity of finding some ulterior motivation
—"traditionally a thankless task in tax cases and one to be avoided if
possible"—was erroneous.
Despite the statement of the Second Circuit that the absence of
tax motivation is insignificant for 482 purposes, the absence of tax
motivation and the presence of business purposes go a long way
towards enabling a taxpayer to gain a judicial reversal of a section 482
reallocation. In a number of cases the presence of a business purpose
and the absence of a tax saving motive have been treated as critical.
Examples are Interior Sec. Corp.," John Wachtel Corp.," J. E. Dil-
worth Co. v. Henslee°" and Jeremiah J. O'Donnell, Jr."
THE ARM'S LENGTH TRANSACTION TEST
Once it is found that there is the community of control requisite
for the use of section 482, and once the Service has determined that
there must be an allocation, one is brought to the nub of the 482 prob-
lem, viz., how many dollars of the allocable items are to be shifted from
one taxpayer to another. As is true in so many areas of the law, the rule
to be followed in deciding this matter can be stated shortly and simply.
59 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952).
69 38 T.C. 330 (1962).
01 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem, 768 (1945).
62 98 F. Supp. 957 (M.D. Tenn. 1951).
63 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 210 (1964).
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The application of such a short and simple rule is, however, a project
of awesome proportions.
The regulations neatly sum up the standard for applying section
482 as follows:
The authority to determine true taxable income extends to
any case in which either by inadvertence or design the tax-
able income, in whole or in part, of a controlled taxpayer, is
other than it would have been had the taxpayer in the con-
duct of his affairs been an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at
arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer."
The above-quoted test has the simplicity of the classic "reasonable
man" tests found in fiduciary and tort law. At the same time it contains
the seed for like amounts of controversy. Once having stated the
"arm's length" test, it is difficult to do other than to plunge into specific
applications of the test. There is little which can be said by way
of refinement of the rule qua rule.
In Revenue Procedure 63-10," the Service published a full
statement of guidelines to be used in applying section 482 for purposes
of reallocating income and expenses between United States taxpayers
and related organizations operating in Puerto Rico. A good part of
the announcement was devoted to the matter of determining arm's
length prices in the case of sales transactions between the related tax-
payers. The Service stated that the best evidence of the applicable arm's
length price was the "price paid in transactions between independent
buyers and sellers for the same product under similar circumstances."
This phraseology is nothing more than a restatement of the above-
quoted part of the regulations. The balance of that part of the Revenue
Procedure is devoted to a discussion of what constitutes the "same
product" and "similar circumstances." The Service points out that if
one of the affected taxpayers makes comparable purchases from inde-
pendent sources, the prices applicable to such other transactions by
the particular taxpayer will be acceptable as a gauge unless such other
prices are "artificial" or "unrealistic." Again, this statement of the
rule is of little assistance in a solution of a particular case. The ruling
goes on to mention a host of factors which should be investigated, such
as whether one of the parties in either the questioned insider trans-
action or in the measuring transaction with outsiders makes tangible
or intangible property available to the other, whether there is a service
fee or royalty involved, etc. The Service then states that where there
are no independent transaction prices available as gauges, the calcu-
lation of a fair arm's length price should be determined on the basis
64 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (1962).
65
 1963-1 Cum. Bull. 490.
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of a rate of profit representative of the rate of profit applicable in
comparable businesses. Again, the ruling recognizes that a host of
factors regarding services, royalties, availability of facilities, and simi-
lar factors all have a bearing on the matter of determination of a fair
profit. Even the slightly expanded concept of arm's length price as
set forth in Revenue Procedure 63-10 is disarmingly simple when
stated. It is as disarmingly simple as the phrase "fair market value"
so prevalent in the tax laws. Like the latter, it is in practice an invita-
tion to controversy.
If there is any "preventive medicine" which may be practiced in
this area, it is in the realm of "building a case" before or at the same
time as there is a transaction which is likely to be challenged under
section 482. Evidence of appraisals and determinations of prices
chargeable in an arm's length transaction are apt to be more impres-
sive to both revenue agents and judges if they are secured contem-
poraneously with the happening of the occurrence which makes them
significant. If real estate is to be sold to an affiliated corporation and
if the transaction may some day be challenged under section 482, the
taxpayers involved are obviously in a better position in the audit or
in litigation if it can be shown that before the intercompany sales price
was determined, an expert and independent opinion as to value was
secured. Once the transaction has been challenged by a revenue agent,
an appraisal secured thereafter (which in the normal course would
mean at least a year after the occurrence of the transaction) is some-
what suspect.
The recent decision of the Tax Court in South Tex. Rice Ware-
house Co." points up the problems to the taxpayer in establishing that
transactions between related entities were had on the same basis as
would have been accomplished in an arm's length transaction between
unrelated parties. In South Tex. Rice Warehouse Co., individual mem-
bers of four families owned stock in a corporation which was engaged
in the business of operating rice storage warehouses. The corporation
leased its warehouse and related assets to a partnership consisting of
all but two of the stockholders in the corporation. The Service at-
tempted to allocate all of the income of the partnership to the related
corporation on the basis of sections 61(a) and 482. The Tax Court
rejected the Commissioner's contention that the partnership was a
sham entity which should be disregarded for income tax purposes. On
the contrary, the court found that the partnership was organized "for
the business purpose of transferring to the adult children of [two of
the adult stockholders] the fathers' interests in the rice drying and
warehousing operation, while permitting the fathers to retain their
66 South Tex. Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. No. 44 (Jan. 29, 1965).
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ownership interest in the physical properties."" This disposed of the
Commissioner's arguments based on section 61(a). However, the Tax
Court went on to consider the Commissioner's arguments under section
482 in terms of rearranging the rental charges paid to the corporate
owner of the property by the partnership lessee.
The rental for the properties had been fixed by the taxpayers at
$48,000 per year. The taxpayers' evidence regarding the fixing of the
rental consisted of the testimony of several of the partners and of an
expert witness. The testimony indicated that there had been actual
negotiations regarding the fixing of the price and that an attorney who
had been consulted when the plan was in the formative stage had ad-
vised the parties that they could lease the property but would have to
pay a reasonable rent. Despite the existence of such a record, the Tax
Court approved the Commissioner's action in resetting the rent at
$78,000 per year. The Tax Court relied upon the following factors to
justify its approval of the Commissioner's action:
1. There was testimony to the effect that the leased property
had a fair market value of $700,000 and the "witnesses in no
way reconciled their opinion as to a fair rental value of the
assets with their testimony as to the fair market value of those
assets." The Tax Court concluded that the opinions as to a
$700,000 fair market value and a $48,000 per year fair rental
value "seem inconsistent."
2. Shortly before the date of the lease, the corporation had built
a bulk storage facility which qualified for accelerated amorti-
zation on a five year basis. The Tax Court concluded that the
"quickie" amortization of this facility would have amounted
to $33,000 per year, whereas the allocable part of the rent
fixed for the properties would have amounted to only $15,000
per year.
3. The taxpayers' expert witness did not explain certain of his
conclusions which, in the view of the Tax Court, involved
significant factors for purposes of determining the fair rental
value of a facility such as that involved.
These bases for the Tax Court's conclusions regarding the fixing
of a fair rent are discouraging to a taxpayer and demonstrate that he
has an uphill battle in establishing that his transaction was handled
on a basis comparable to that which would have been achieved in an
arm's length transaction between unrelated parties. On the other hand,
the comments of the Tax Court regarding the significance of the attor-
67 Ibid.
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ney's advice that the rent should be fixed at a reasonable amount are
nothing short of startling in their implications. In this connection, the
court stated:
[W]hile we do not doubt that the matter [of the rental figure]
was negotiated and the result of the negotiation was the
$48,000 figure, the logical inference for [sic] the record as a
whole is that the negotiation was not an arm's length one but
was for the purpose of satisfying the condition that the attor-
ney who had been consulted by the prospective partners had
placed as a requirement for the transaction not being ques-
tioned tax-wise, "that they could lease the property but .. .
would have to pay a reasonable rent.""
Since there is nothing in the case to indicate that the attorney's
advice regarding the importance of fixing a fair rental was other than a
good faith admonition, it is difficult to understand why the presence
of such a comment in the initial stages of the transaction should make
the resulting negotiations suspect. The presence of this comment in
the Tax Court's opinion places tax counsel in an untenable position.
The implication is that if tax counsel senses that a transaction may be
attacked under 482, his perfectly good faith advice to cast the trans-
action in such a form that it can pass the arm's length transaction test
may in itself be construed as evidence that the transaction flunks
the test.
Despite this disturbing feature of the South Tex. Rice Warehouse
Co. opinion, it is self-evident that a competent and ethical tax counsel-
lor should continue to advise clients to arrange their affairs so as to
be in the best possible position to resist a section 482 attack.
The Commissioner has not been wholly successful in establishing
the arm's length transactions test as the only one applicable for test-
ing allocations in 482 cases. In Frank v. International Canadian Corp.,"
the decision of a district court had approved inter-company pricing
based upon costs plus a 6 percent profit, regardless of whether such a
price constituted the same price which would have been secured in a
like transaction with a stranger. In so ruling, the court of appeals
pointed out that the government's arguments on this issue found little
support in the record. The tenor of the court's opinion, however, indi-
cates that the arm's length test is not exclusive and that in appropriate
cases a reasonable return or reasonable profit test may be applied.
Nonetheless, it is likely that the Service will continue to stress the
arm's length transaction test.
68 Ibid.
CD 308 F.2d .520 (9th Cir. 1962).
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Standards of Judicial Review
The courts have frequently stated that to secure a reversal of
the Commissioner's actions in shifting tax factors pursuant to section
482, the taxpayer must establish that the action of the Commissioner
was arbitrary and that he abused his discretion in applying the sec-
tion.70 In reading the cases it is difficult to discern that the taxpayers'
burden of proving that the Commissioner's actions in applying sec-
tion 482 were arbitrary or constituted an abuse of discretion is appre-
ciably greater than the burden cast on taxpayers in most civil tax liti-
gation, i.e., the burden of overcoming the presumptive correctness of
the Commissioner's determinations. One would assume that the burden
of proving that any action of a public official is arbitrary or capricious
would be well nigh unbearable. The fact that the courts have fre-
quently reversed or modified the Commissioner's action under section
482 demonstrates that this burden can be and often is sustained.
In T. R. Vardeman v. United States"- the court disapproved the
Commissioner's action in allocating all of the income of a corporation
to a related partnership. After reciting fact and reasoning which seemed
no different than that involved in hundreds of other cases in which a
taxpayer disagrees with a Service determination, the court concluded
that in disregarding the corporation and allocating its income to the
partnership the Commissioner "acted arbitrarily and abused his dis-
cretion, if any, to so act."
Bank of Kimball v. United States 72 involved a bank and a related
insurance agency partnership composed of bank stockholders. The
partnership used the bank premises and facilities. The Commissioner
allocated the common expenses according to the ratio that the incomes
of each bore to the total incomes. The court concluded that this method
of allocation was "arbitrary, unreasonable, and contrary to the evi-
dence." The court went on to reallocate $750 of expenses from the
partnership to the bank. Ironically, the court, in rejecting the Com-
missioner's allocation as arbitrary, admitted that the evidence on this
issue was not precise and proceeded with its own allocation on the
basis of the Cohan rule."
In Motor & Indus. Fin. Corp. v. Scofield, 74 the court, in rejecting
the Commissioner's method of allocating expenses among affiliated
corporations on the basis of their proportionate incomes, found that
there was no substantial evidence in the record to support such a
method. Such a basis for decision seems more consistent with a re-
70
 7 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 38.63 (1942).
71 209 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Tex. 1962).
72 200 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. S.D. 1962).
73 Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).
74 55-1 US. Tax Cas. 4 9493 (W.D. Tex. 1955).
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versa] of the Commissioner because he was wrong rather than because
he acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
The Tax Court has concluded that in a section 482 case it is not
required to accept all parts of the Commissioner's determination."
This seems to be further proof of the proposition that judicial review
of section 482 cases is not fundamentally different from that in other
areas.
Chief Judge Hutcheson of the Fifth Circuit in Pearson Motor Co.
v. Commissioner" wrote a concurring opinion solely for the purpose
of stating his disagreement with Judge Tuttle's dissenting opinion re-
garding the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's actions
under section 45. Chief Judge Hutcheson rejected the view that a
determination under section 45 is (in his words) "almost if not quite
sacrosanct and unreviewable."
The concurring and dissenting opinions in the Pearson Motor Co.
case point out that in practice the standards for judicial review of 482
determinations are not fundamentally different from those prevailing
elsewhere in the tax law.
CONCLUSION
Both the increasing volume of litigation and the recent experience
of practitioners indicate that the Service is increasingly utilizing sec-
tion 482 in income tax audits. The Service is turning to section 482
not only as a principal weapon in attacking many taxpayer trans-
actions, but is also using it as a supporting weapon in cases in which
other sections of the Code and other rules of tax law constitute the
principal weapons. One can anticipate that this use will be accelerated.
The principal and still undecided issue regarding the application
of section 482 is whether that section can be used to accomplish a
"consolidation" of the net incomes of related taxpayers. On other issues
regarding the scope of 482, the courts, through judicial review of the
Commissioner's determination, have imposed limits on his action by
using standards not fundamentally different from those relied upon
in other areas.
75 Nat Harrison Associates, Inc., supra note 40; Pauline W. Arch, 42 T.C. 114 (1964).
76 246 F.2d 509, 515 (5th Cir. 1957).
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